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1938] NOTES
necessary for the manufacturer to know of the defect; it is
enough that he negligently failed to detect it."
Many cases have been out of line with this development.
Such a one is Curtain v. Somerset," which is cited as authority by
the principal case. However, it is now doubtful whether Curtain
v. Somerset is authority even in its own jurisdiction.' The prin-
cipal case also relies heavily upon Cooley on Torts'T to the effect
that privity of contract is necessary for liability. It should be
noted, however, that in the latter part of the section relied upon,
Cooley points out the modifications of the rule and the tendency
to abandon it.18 The principal decision has overlooked ninety-six
years of development on this principle. It is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court will rectify the Louisiana jurisprudence in this
regard when the question may be presented there.
M.R.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE- CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN Co-TORTFEASORS
-In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. DeJean,l the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana considered the right of contribution between negligent co-
tortfeasors who are not co-judgment-debtors. Sandoz, passenger
in an automobile driven by defendant De Jean, was injured in a
collision between that car and another car driven by one Beridon.
Both Sandoz and De Jean sued Beridon. The Court of Appeal
2
denied recovery to De Jean because of his own contributory
negligence but gave judgment in favor of Sandoz. Present plain-
tiff, insurer and subrogee of Beridon, paid Sandoz and then sued
14. MacPherson v. The Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916); O'Brien v. American Bridge Co. of N.J., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012,
32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 980 (1910), noted (1910) 59 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 47.
15. 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891).
16. In Grodsteln v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 Atl. 794 (1931) a contractor
was held liable to the wife of the person with whom he had contracted, for
injuries resulting from defective construction. Cf. Griffith v. Atlantic Re-
fining Co., 305 Pa. 386, 157 Atl. 791, 793 (1931): "It is to be noted that the rule
laid down in Curtain v. Somerset has been very much modified by the decision
in Grodstein v. McGivern."
17. 3 Cooley, Law of Torts (4 ed. 1932) § 498.
18. Ibid. citing McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.
(2nd) 122, 126 (1927) where the court says: "We think the exception should
be extended to include 'a thing which when applied to its intended use,
becomes dangerous,' although not inherently so."
1. 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936).
2. Sandoz v. Beridon, 150 So. 25 (La. App. 1933).
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De Jean for half the amount paid. Plaintiff's contention was that
the contributory negligence of De Jean rendered him co-tortfea-
sor with Beridon and, hence, liable in solido with the latter for
the amount of the judgment. Held: (1) the judgment that De
Jean was guilty of such contributory negligence as would prevent
recovery by him does not establish his liability as co-tortfeasor
with Beridon; (2) the judgment against the latter imposed an
individual debt upon him for the payment of which he is not
entitled to contribution; (3) the liability of an alleged negligent
co-tortfeasor may not be established originally in an action for
contribution instituted by a tortfeasor who has been condemned
alone to pay damages. 4
As early as 1814, the Louisiana court put its stamp of disap-
proval upon the idea that those condemned for their wilful torts
might seek out others and fix upon them a share of responsibility
for the damage done.5 In 1895, the leading case of Sincer v. Bell'
crystallized the rule that no right of contribution arises between
negligent co-tortfeasors. In 1931, the Court of Appeals for the
Parish of Orleans followed the doctrine of the Sincer case on two
occasions,7 stating the rule to be that "... solidary liability rests
on joint tortfeasors. Each, if guilty of negligence proximately
contributing to an accident, is liable for the whole damage. An
injured party may sue either or both and neither has any right
against the other."" This position is in accord with the over-
3. Art. 2324, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. The following language of the Court of Appeals was quoted with
approval: "In order for Dr. Beridon or for plaintiff, as his alleged subrogee,
to recover from De Jean, it must be shown independently that Dr. Beridon
and De Jean were jointly guilty toward Sandoz of the tort that injured and
damaged him. That can only be done by a trial on the merits, if the case
should ever reach a trial on the merits .. ." (185 La. at 1077, 171 So. at 451)
(italics supplied). Does the court imply that the difficulty is merely pro-
cedural? Is this the case of a right without a remedy? Apparently consider-
ing that there should be a remedy in such case, the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1938) provide for "Third-Party Practice" as follows: Rule
14 (a) " . . . a defendant may move .. . for leave as a third-party plaintiff to
serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him.. ." (italics supplied). Cf. Flory and McMahon,
The New Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice (1938) 1 La. L. Rev. 45, 58.
5. Meunier v. Duperron, 3 Mart. (0. S.) 285 (1814) (unlawful arrest and
sale of a free negro woman).
6. 47 La. Ann. 1548, 18 So. 755 (1895).
7. Rumpf v. Callo, 16 La. App. 14, 132 So. 763 (1931); Thalheim v. Suhren,
137 So. 874 (La. App. 1931).
8. Thalheim v. Suhren, 137 So. 874 (La. App. 1931) (italics supplied).
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whelming majority of American decisions9 and with the pro-
nouncement of the American Law Institute.10
A so-called exception to the general rule is recognized both
at common law and in Louisiana. This exception is invoked in
cases in which the actual fault is attributable to one of several
co-tortfeasors and the other or others are only technically or con-
structively at fault 1 ' The principle, which is really one of indem-
nity rather than of contribution, is illustrated by Appalachain
Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co.'2 In that case, the owner of a
newly purchased building recovered from the former owner dam-
ages paid to a third party for injury resulting from a defect in the
building, because, at the time of the injury, the former owner was
still in possession of the premises. The new owner was liable
only because of the legal status as owner and not by reason of
any act of negligence. In 1933, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
further modified the accepted doctrine. In Quatray v. Wicker 3 it
was held that, if the negligent co-tortfeasors have been joined as
defendants in the original action and judicially condemned in
solido, a right of contribution arises under Article 2103 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.' 4 That article, which specifically
deals with contractual solidary obligors, was extended to cover
co-judgment debtors whose original relation was that of joint-
tortfeasors. Such an extension is consonant with the suggestion
that the foundation of the claim for contribution rests" . . . on the
9. Union Stock Yards Co. of 0. and C. v. Chicago, B. and Q. R.R. Co.,
196 U.S. 217, 25 S.Ct. 226, 49 L.Ed. 453, 2 Ann. Cas. 525 (1905); City of Tacoma
v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 505, 118 Pac. 642, Ann. Cas. 1913B 934, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.)
582 (1911); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194, 75
A.L.R. 1481 (1930); Manowitz v. Kanov, 107 N.J. Law 523, 154 Atl. 326, 75
A.L.R. 1464 (1931). For extensive citation to recent authorities, see Seavey
and Scott, Notes on Restatement of Restitution, Pocket Supplement (1937)
164, notes on § 102.
10. Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 102.
11. Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 96. Whereas this section primarily
covers the principal and agent relationship, both the language and spirit are
sufficiently broad to cover the factual situations under discussion. For exten-
sive citations see: Ann. Cas. 1913B 938, 942; Rule Denying Contribution Be-
tween Joint Tortfeasors as Affected by Proximate Cause, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 583;
Seavey and Scott, supra note 9, at 160, notes on § 96.
12. 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922). Accord: Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La.
469, 75 So. 209 (1917) (parent's liability for the torts of his minor child). In
Rumpf v. Callo, 16 La. App. 14, 132 So. 763 (1931), the court speaks of the
doctrine of the Appalachain Corp. case as the "only" exception to the general
rule denying contribution between co-tortfeasors.
13. 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933), noted (1934) 9 Tulane L. .Rev. 125. Sin-
cer v. Bell was distinguished on the ground that the present parties were not
only alleged co-tortfeasors but were also solidary judgment debtors.
14. Art. 2103, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The obligation contracted on [in]
1938 1
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decree which created the civil debt and was not controlled by
the principles relating to contribution between joint tortfeasors."' 5
The common law rule denying contribution between co-tort-
feasors may be traced to the English case of Merryweather v.
Nixan16 in which the joint tortfeasors were intentional wrong-
doers and the basis of the decision lay in the maxim ex turpi
causa non oritur actio. The almost universal extension of this
"public policy" principle to include situations merely involving
negligence has been much criticized.' The theory of the gener-
ally accepted view is plain enough. The law is unwilling to lend
its aid to one whose conduct has not measured up to legal stand-
ards; a person who has violated the law should not be able to
invoke it to obtain relief with reference to the same transaction.
If the basis of this inhibition lies in the theory that potential legal
liability will cause persons to refrain from legally objectionable
activity, it would seem that there is scant justification for apply-
ing the rule of "no-contribution" to cases involving negligence
alone. Granting that certainty of liability for damage might
cause individuals like the average motorist to exercise a greater
degree of care, it must be remembered that denial of contribution
gives each of two negligent parties a "sporting chance" of escap-
ing all liability.
Despite adverse comment, only three states' have been suf-
ficiently moved-in the absence of statute-to limit the rule
denying contribution to cases in which the co-tortfeasors were
solido toward the creditor, is of right divided amongst the debtors who,
amongst themselves, are liable each only for his part and portion."
In the Quatray decision, the court said: "It is true that the article refers
to an obligation contracted in solido; but the rules relating to obligations in
solido, or Joint obligations, are the same with regard to obligations arising
ex delicto as with regard to obligations arising ex contractu, especially when
they are fixed by a judicial decree . . ." (178 La. at 301, 151 So. at 212).
15. Note (1906) 2 Ann. Cas. 528, 529, citing Palmer v. Wick and P. S. S.
Co., Ltd., [1894] A.C. 318.
16. 8 T. R. 186 (K.B. 1799); Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan (1898) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 176.
17. Burdick, The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1926) 262, 263; Cooley, A Treatise
on the Law of Torts (3rd ed. 1906) 254-262; Harper, A Treatise on the Law of
Torts (1933) 679-682; Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfea-
sors (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 552, and authorities cited; Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130, 139 et seq.,
and authorities cited; Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability (1937) 25
Calif. L. Rev. 413, 425, and authorities cited. See also Gregory, Legislative
Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions (1936).
18. Minnesota, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Underwriters at Lloyds of
Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 38, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); Duluth, M. and N.
Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931); Furbeck v. I. Gevurtz
and Son, 72 Ore. 12, 143 Pac. 654, 922 (1914); Armstrong County v. Clarion
County, 66 Pa. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 368 (1870); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co.,
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chargeable with knowledge that their acts were wrongful. A
dozen states have accomplished a similar result-to varying de-
grees-by legislation. 9 In Louisiana and in other states which
regard civil damages as purely compensatory, it would be difficult
to so limit the rule other than by statute, because under such a
theory there can be no reason for distinguishing wilful and negli-
gent torts.2 0
In sum, the Louisiana rule appears to be that a right of con-
tribution arises between co-tortfeasors (whether wilful or negli-
gent) if, and only if, their joint responsibility has been deter-
mined judicially. Such a judicial determination can be had only
by a judgment in solido against them in the original tort action.
There is no way in which one condemned alone may establish
the concurrent negligence of his fellow. It is submitted, however,
that there is no real reason why parties who have been con-
demned alone for merely negligent offenses should be denied the
privilege of legally establishing the liability of fellow tortfeasors
and obtaining contribution. If the merely negligent tortfeasor
were given an action against concurrent wrongdoers, no funda-
mental principle of justice would be violated and liability would
be placed upon all the parties at fault. The increased adoption
of "comparative negligence" principles indicates that modern
legal thought favors such proportionate allocation of responsi-
bility. B. B. T., Jr.
WILLS-INSURANCE PROCEEDS-DEBT EXEMPTION NOT APPLIC-
ABLE WHEN CONTRARY TO EXPRESS INTENTION OF TESTATOR-The in-
sured directed in his will that the proceeds of his insurance pol-
292 Pa. 354, 141 AtI. 231 (1928). Accord: Mills v. Cox, 28 Cour Sup6rieure 375
(Quebec 1905). For a discussion of the French commentators, see Note (1934)
9 Tulane L. Rev. 125.
19. Ga. Code Ann. (Michie, 1926) §§ 4512-13 ("joint trespassers" only);
Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923) § 60-3437 (procedural statute as to joint judg-
ments); Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1930) § 484a; Md. Ann. Code (Bagby Supp. 1929)
art. 50, § 12a; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 14497 (libel cases only); Mo. Rev.
Stat. (1929) § 3268; N. C. Code Ann. (1931) § 618; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Court-
right, 1929) §§ 76-101; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Gilbert-Bliss 1936 Supp.) § 211a;
Tex. Rev. Civ. Code (Vernon, 1928) § 2212; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930)
§ 5779; W. Va. Code (931) c. 55, art. 7, § 13. The broad type of statute is
illustrated by the Kentucky and Virginia acts. See Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 130, 140, n. 66;
Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions (1936).
20. Chief Justice O'Niell pointed out that such a distinction ". . . could
hardly be reconciled with the rule, in Louisiana, that only compensatory
damages, and not punitive damages, are allowable in a civil action . .
Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. at 298, 151 So. at 211 (1933).
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